FEATURE: How Technology will Make or Mar INEC in 2027
By Mumeenah Oyindamola Abdulrahman
When Nigerians head to the polls, the expectation is simple: every eligible voter should be able to vote, every valid vote should count, and the results should reflect the people’s choice, but, achieving this has remain one of Nigeria’s persistent democratic challenges.
Over the years, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has introduced technologies to improve electoral transparency and credibility. From handwritten voter registers to biometric accreditation and digital result portals, considerable progress has been made. But if technology is meant to strengthen elections, why do familiar problems continue to resurface?
To understand this, we must examine how Nigeria’s electoral system evolved, what INEC has achieved, and what still needs to change.
Before INEC: Nigeria’s Electoral History
Nigeria’s electoral history predates independence. The Clifford Constitution of 1922 introduced elective representation into the Legislative Council, leading to elections in 1923. At the time, colonial authorities administered elections without a dedicated national electoral commission.
The Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) was established in the late 1950s to conduct the 1959 federal elections. Following independence, the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) managed elections until the military coup of 1966.
Subsequent electoral bodies included FEDECO, which conducted the 1979 and 1983 elections; the National Electoral Commission (NEC), which supervised the annulled June 12, 1993 presidential election; and NECON, established under General Sani Abacha.
In 1998, General Abdulsalami Abubakar established INEC, which organised the elections that ushered in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic in May 1999.
Between 1999 and 2023, five substantive chairpersons supervised seven general election cycles, each introducing or expanding reforms intended to address existing electoral weaknesses.
1999–2007: From Manual Elections to Biometric Registration
Under Justice Ephraim Akpata, the 1999 elections relied predominantly on manual voter registration, accreditation, voting and result collation. Although they marked Nigeria’s return to civilian rule, observers raised concerns about irregularities and transparency.
Dr Abel Guobadia’s administration introduced Optical Mark Recognition (OMR) technology to computerise voter registration ahead of the 2003 elections. However, inaccurate records, logistical difficulties and continued reliance on manual procedures limited its effectiveness.
Professor Maurice Iwu subsequently introduced Direct Data Capture (DDC) machines, enabling electronic collection of voters’ photographs, fingerprints and personal information.
This marked an important transition towards biometric registration. However, equipment and software problems affected implementation, while election-day accreditation and result collation remained largely manual.
The 2007 elections attracted widespread criticism over irregularities and administrative failures, demonstrating that collecting biometric information alone could not guarantee electoral credibility.
2011–2015: Electronic Voter Accreditation
Under Professor Attahiru Jega, INEC conducted a fresh biometric registration exercise in 2011, enrolling more than 73 million voters.
The commission also introduced Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) and deployed Smart Card Readers (SCRs) during the 2015 general elections.
For the first time, electronic devices played a direct role in authenticating voters at polling units, creating additional safeguards against impersonation and irregular accreditation.
However, some devices failed to authenticate fingerprints, requiring alternative procedures, including incident forms. Even then sitting President, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, experienced accreditation difficulties.
Although the 2015 elections marked Nigeria’s first presidential victory by an opposition candidate over an incumbent, electronic accreditation did not eliminate vulnerabilities associated with manual result collation.
The lesson was clear: securing voter identification is important, but electoral transparency must extend beyond accreditation.
2019–2023: BVAS, IReV and Digital Transparency
Under Professor Mahmood Yakubu, INEC expanded its technological systems.
In 2019, simultaneous accreditation and voting replaced the earlier arrangement requiring voters to return after accreditation. Nevertheless, the elections were postponed by one week because of logistical difficulties.
INEC introduced the Result Viewing Portal (IReV) in 2020, allowing public access to uploaded polling-unit result sheets.
The Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS), introduced in 2021, strengthened voter authentication through fingerprints and facial recognition while supporting result-sheet uploads.
The Electoral Act 2022 provided additional legal backing for technological accreditation.
However, during the February 2023 presidential election, INEC experienced technical difficulties uploading presidential results to IReV, even as National Assembly uploads proceeded.
INEC attributed the problem to a system-configuration issue. The European Union Election Observation Mission reported that only approximately 20% of presidential polling-unit result forms were available on IReV by noon the following day.
Although INEC maintained that the problem did not undermine the election’s credibility, independent observers raised concerns about transparency.
The controversy exposed an important distinction: IReV provides public access to results but does not replace the legally recognised collation process.
It also demonstrated that introducing technology is insufficient if its reliability, transparency and legal responsibilities remain unclear.
2026: AI-Generated Voter Records and Emerging Cybersecurity Concerns
As Nigeria prepares for the 2027 elections, reported irregularities in INEC’s preliminary voters’ register have introduced another concern.
In October 2026, reports emerged of suspicious registrations containing photographs believed to have been generated using artificial intelligence, alongside duplicate and questionable voter records.
Subsequent reports alleged that some irregularities involved registration officials with authorised system access. INEC reportedly removed approximately 1.61 million invalid records and identified 54 officials for investigation.
These figures concern registration irregularities generally, not exclusively AI-generated photographs, and require confirmation against official records.
The controversy raises an important cybersecurity question: what happens when individuals authorised to operate electoral technology allegedly misuse their access?
This highlights the importance of addressing insider threats, access controls, data integrity and independent verification.
Although automated biometric systems can help identify suspicious registrations, technology alone cannot guarantee that fraudulent information never enters a database.
Importantly, the reported irregularities concerned a preliminary register, not evidence that fictitious voters successfully participated in an election.
What Still Needs to Be Done?
INEC’s technological development demonstrates progress, but recurring problems suggest that reform must go beyond introducing new devices.
First, technological infrastructure must be strengthened. BVAS, IReV and related platforms should undergo realistic stress testing before elections, including simulations involving poor connectivity, electricity interruptions and heavy server traffic.
Second, cybersecurity must become a central priority. Stronger access controls, encryption, audit logs, independent security assessments and continuous monitoring could help protect electoral systems against external attacks and insider misuse.
Third, voter registration requires stronger verification procedures. Measures against duplicate records and AI-generated identities should be accompanied by safeguards protecting legitimate voters from wrongful exclusion.
Fourth, transparency must extend beyond digital platforms. INEC should publish meaningful technical assessments, explain system failures promptly and clarify how electronic uploads relate to official result collation.
Fifth, technology must be supported by effective training and logistics. Electoral officials need practical preparation, reliable equipment and clearly documented contingency procedures.
Finally, electoral laws and technological procedures must be aligned. Public expectations should reflect clearly established legal requirements, while accountability mechanisms should ensure that failures are properly investigated.
Bottom Line
From manual voter registers to biometric accreditation and digital result portals, INEC has undergone considerable technological transformation.
However, the experiences of 2015, 2023 and the reported registration concerns of 2026 demonstrate that technology introduces new responsibilities alongside its benefits.
Nigeria’s electoral future should not depend solely on acquiring more sophisticated devices, but on strengthening the institutions, infrastructure and accountability systems supporting them.
Ultimately, electoral technology should be judged not by how advanced it appears, but by how effectively it protects the integrity of elections and earns public confidence.















